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Abstract 
 
 The aim of the paper is to evaluate, through panel data dynamic models, the 
effects of structural public balance adjustment on relative poverty in 16 Euro-
zone countries from 2005 till 2013. The estimates are conducted by using the 
mean group (MG), the pooled mean group (PMG) and the dynamic fixed effects 
(DFE) estimators. The first two yield estimates of the long-run coefficients with-
out the implausible assumption of identical dynamics in each country allowing 
to detect a stable relationship even in presence of reduced explanatory variables. 
They all – through the error correction form – allow for considering the relation 
between the variables in their level and the dynamic of adjustment in the short-run. 
All the techniques generate outcomes supporting the conclusion that fiscal re-
trenchments increase relative poverty both in the short and in the long-run. 
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Introduction 
 
 The Eurozone policy prescriptions suggest maintaining a sustainable public 
finance. The underlying idea is that, without fiscal consolidation programs, growth 
will be compromised, and although fiscal retrenchment might have adverse effects 
in the short-run, the alternative would be a long-run decline (Berti, De Castro 
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and Salto, 2013). These prescriptions follow the prevailing theoretical paradigm 
according to which fiscal contraction, especially in the form of structural balance 
adjustments, has positive effects on growth and employment. The effects of fiscal 
consolidation are assured by a kind of “super-Barro” effect, according to which 
fiscal contraction has a more than proportional effect on permanent income (these 
are called Keynesian effects of non-Keynesian fiscal policies and are discussed 
in Canale et al., 2008). 
 In recent times these conclusions appear to be not so obvious and the exist-
ence of a “zero lower bound” raised questions concerning the effects of fiscal 
consolidation on unemployment and households income (IMF, 2010; Blanchard 
and Leigh, 2013). In the absence of effective monetary policy measures, fiscal 
retrenchment is said to have greater-than-expected adverse effects upon growth 
(Christiano, Einchenbaum and Rebelo, 2011; Delong and Summers, 2012; IMF, 
2010; Blanchard and Leigh, 2013), and hence upon employment and house-
holds’ income.  
 As in the case of the effects on growth and unemployment, the question 
whether or not the implementation of structural adjustment programs causes an 
increase of the number of those who experience the worsening of the economic 
conditions in respect to others remains open. The issue of inequality is receiving 
among academics an ever increasing interest, especially in these times of crisis. 
Fiscal consolidation could have a direct effect on living conditions through the 
reduction of specific public budgetary components and an induced effect due to 
the positive value of the Keynesian multiplier. In regard to the Eurozone, some 
studies have tried to dissolve these doubts trough descriptive data analysis 
(Petmesidou and Guillèn, 2015 and through the specific analysis of the case of 
Greece (Matsaganis and Leventi, 2014; and Mitrakos, 2014). The most recent 
contribution is Darvas et al. (2014), who conclude that in times of crisis co-move-
ments of fiscal consolidation programs and adverse social condition are regis-
tered. However none of them can be considered as supporting the existence 
of a stable relationship between structural adjustment programs and conditions 
of relative poverty in the Eurozone. 
 The aim of this paper is to further deepen these studies and to investigate the 
relationship between structural adjustment and relative poverty in 16 EU coun-
tries from 2005 till 2013. The objective is to explore this link in order to individ-
uate the dimension and the sign of it whatever the composition and the nature of 
fiscal consolidation programs are. Even though the sample contains a time span 
in which some countries did not yet belong to the Eurozone, they all share have 
been sharing similar constraints requested to respect the fiscal parameters of the 
currency union which they entered in the following years. 
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 As an indicator of structural adjustment, the change in structural balance is 
used. The decomposition of the public budget into current, cyclical and structural 
components is aimed at separating cyclical influences on the budget balance – 
resulting from the divergence between actual and potential output (the output 
gap) – from those that are non-cyclical. As a consequence, changes in the struc-
tural budgets “can be seen as a cause rather than an effect of output fluctuations 
and may be interpreted as indicative of discretionary policy adjustments” (OECD, 
2014). As an indicator of relative poverty, the percentage of people having an 
income below the 60% of national median equalized disposable income is used. 
This is the indicator the European statistics adopt to quantify the percentage of 
people at risk of poverty rate and has the advantage of a country-specific meas-
ure. The Eurostat’s glossary states that “this indicator does not measure wealth 
or poverty, but low income in comparison to other residents in that country, 
which does not necessarily imply a low standard of living” (Eurostat, 2014). It is 
rather a measure of inequality. As Darvas et al. (2014) show, there is a very 
strong association between the at-risk-of-poverty rate and the Gini-coefficient.1 
The aim is to individuate a general relationship without considering the nature 
and composition of fiscal adjustment. 
 The estimations are conducted by using the dynamic panel data econometric 
techniques and in particular the mean group (MG), the pooled mean group 
(PMG) and the dynamic fixed effect (DFE) estimators. The first two yield esti-
mates of the long-run coefficients without the implausible assumption of identi-
cal dynamics in each country (Pesaran and Smith, 1995; Pesaran, Shin and Smith 
1997; 1999). They all – through the error correction form (ECM) – allow con-
sidering the relationship between the variables in their level and the dynamic of 
adjustment in the short-run. 
 Although two out of three of the empirical models (MG and PMG) do not re-
quire as preliminary the co-integration analysis, this is implemented in order to 
reinforce the estimation linkages in presence of just one dependent variable and 
a reduced number of observations. All the techniques generate outcomes both in 
the long and in the short-run consistent with the same sign effect of discretionary 
fiscal policy measures of the percentage of people at risk of poverty rate. This 
conclusion provides a first straightforward glance at the relationship between 
fiscal retrenchments and inequality. 
                                                     
 
1
 For the period 2007 – 2012, the average values of the indicators show a correlation coeffi-
cient of about 0.90, implying a 0.82 R2 for the regression. High levels of income inequality can 
be identified as having adverse implications for society, but should not be mixed with poverty 
(Darvas et al., 2014, pp. 28 – 29). 
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 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 contains the 
empirical analysis and is divided into two sub-sections: 1.1. Methodology and 
1.2. Results. Last section draws some conclusions. 
 
 
1.  Econometrical Analysis 
 
 The data on the percentage of people having an income below the 60% of 
national median equalized disposable income are available on the Eurostat web-
site. The structural balance is available at the IMF outlook database and is 
transformed to obtain the structural adjustment in the following way: structural 
adjustment is the difference between the structural balance SB of time t and time 
t – 1: 
1, , , ti t i t i t
SA SB SB
−
= − . A positive value of 
,i tSA  means that the country has 
been implementing, over the whole time interval, a reduction in its structural 
deficit or an increase of the structural surplus if this is the case, i.e. a restrictive 
discretionary fiscal policy and vice versa.2 The annual data from 2005 till 2013 
for sixteen Eurozone countries are used. The countries are Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.3 For Latvia the data are 
available from 2008: it was worth including it in the sample in order to maintain 
the representativeness and observations.4 The total number of observations is 141, 
reduced to 125 because of the dynamic techniques. 
 A preliminary data inspection provides a first glance at the link between the 
variables. In Figure 1, the percentage of people having an income below the 60% 
of national median equalized disposable income and the change in structural bal-
ance from 2005 till 2013 are presented for the countries considered. In almost all 
the graphs we observe a common trend of the two variables as they grow together. 
It is worth noting two contrasting cases: Greece, where the same sign relation-
ship is particularly evident and Slovakia, where the variables appear to move, 
at least in the first years, in the opposite directions. 
                                                     
 
2
 The European Commission uses as an alternative indicator the Cyclically Adjusted Budget 
Balance (CAB), which is inferior to the Structural Balance (SB), since it includes one-time 
measures and also includes interest payments (which can increase as public debt explodes or inter-
est rates rise, but such increase in interest expenditures should not be regarded as a discretionary 
fiscal stimulus) Darvas et al. (2014), p. 14. 
 
 
3
 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Por-
tugal and Spain are original members of the Euro Area formed in 1999. Later other member states 
joined the single currency in different periods. In particular, Greece entered the Eurozone in 2001, 
Slovenia in 2007, Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2009 and finally Latvia in 2014. 
 
 
4
 The estimations on a sample excluding Latvia do not provide very different results. 
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F i g u r e  1  
Relative Poverty and Structural Adjustment in the Eurozone:  
Time Dynamics 2005 – 2013 
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Source: Own calculation on IMF and Eurostat data.    
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 More evidence is provided in Figure 2, where the relationship between the 
panel mean values for each period of the two variables considered is presented 
in the form of a scatter plot. The coefficient of structural adjustment is positive 
and equal to 0.33 and R2 = 0.90. 
 
F i g u r e  2  
Relative Poverty and Structural Adjustment in the Eurozone:  
Scatter Plot 2005 – 2013 
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Source: Own calculation on IMF and Eurostat data. 
 
 The regression line is upwardly sloped and the panel means values stand near it. 
 
1.1.  Methodology 
 
The econometrical techniques adopted are a special subset of dynamic panel data 
models according to which it is possible to estimate simultaneously the long and 
the short-run effects of the independent on the dependent variable. As a matter of 
fact, the DFE, the MG and PMG estimators, through the ECM, allows for con-
sidering the relation between the variables in their level and the dynamic of ad-
justment in the short-run. They allow, since they imply co-integration, to indi-
viduate the eventual presence of a stable relationship, even in presence of a re-
duced number of explanatory variables. The DFE estimator constrains the co-
efficient both in the long and in the short-run to be equal across groups and just 
the intercept to differ across countries. However if the coefficient dynamic are 
not equal across groups this estimator could produce misleading results. The MG 
methodology (see Pesaran and Smith, 1995) estimates the N time series regressions 
Struct ral j st t ( ean by date) 
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and averages the coefficients. This model, therefore, relies on separate estimates 
for each group, and calculates a simple arithmetic average of the coefficients of 
each group (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). With this estimator, the intercepts, slope 
coefficients both in the short and in the long-run, and error variances are all 
allowed to differ across groups. In an intermediate position between the DFE 
and the MG estimator stands the PMG model. In the PMG short-run coefficients 
are allowed to vary across groups, while long-run dynamics are constrained to be 
equal (Pesaran, Shin, and Smith, 1997; 1999. For a pedagogical explanation see 
Brackburne and Frank, 2007). 
 The features of both MG and PMG are considered to be consistent in particu-
lar to estimate dynamic panels in which parameters are heterogeneous across 
groups. This fits the case of the 16 Eurozone countries in which different long-   
-run dynamics and heterogeneous speeds of convergence in each country could 
bring to misleading results. However in small samples (few time and individual 
observations), the MG estimator, being an unweighted average, is very sensitive to 
outlying country estimates and may release distorted outcomes. The PMG estimator 
performs better than MG in case of small samples because it produces estimates 
that are similar to weighted averages of the restrictive country specific estimates, 
where the weights are given according to their precision (Loayza and Rancière, 
2006). The equations to be estimated assume the long and the short-run form.  
 The long-run equation follows the ADRL process using current and past val-
ues of the explanatory variables and is described by:  
 
, , 1 ,0 , ,1 , 1 ,          i t i i i t i i t i i t i tPR PR SA SAα λ β β ε− −= + + + +              (1) 
 
 This is the long-run specification equation where PR is the poverty rate indi-
cator, while SA is the change in structural balance, or structural adjustment, 
i represents the country and t the time. According to the ECM form the residuals 
coming out of the long-run equation are then used to verify the long-run con-
vergence toward the equilibrium value or to verify, as it is called, the speed of 
adjustment. So that in the short-run changes in the dependent variable should 
depend on changes in the independent variables plus an error term measuring if 
they converge. Therefore the error correction equation describing the short-run 
speed of adjustment is:  
 
 
, , 1 1, , ,1 , ,  (    )    i t i i t i i i t i i t i tPR PR SA SAφ ϑ ϑ β µ−∆ = − − − ∆ +               (2) 
 
 Where, with simple transformations, it is easy to verify that: 
  
1
i
i
i
αϑ λ= − ,
,0 ,1
1,   1
i i
i
i
β βϑ λ
+
=
−
 are the long-run coefficient calculated as a weigh-
ted average of the coefficient of the independent variables.  
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 The weight is given by the coefficient of the dynamic dependent variable. 
And 
  (1  )i iφ λ= − − is the error-correction speed of adjustment.  
 The parameter 1iϑ for the long-run, 1,iβ  for the short-run and iφ  for the speed 
of adjustment are of primary interest. In the MG estimator all parameters vary 
across countries and the results are averages of the panel members. In the PMG 
and DFE estimator the constraint of homogeneity of long-run coefficients is im-
posed so that iϑ ϑ= . In the short-run for the PMG estimator parameters vary, 
while for the DFE an homogeneous dynamic of adjustment is supposed and it 
holds 1, 1iβ β= . 
 Since all the models assume different hypotheses on both the long and the 
short-run coefficient and the estimates can be considered consistent and efficient 
if the restrictions are true, the result coming out of the application of all the three 
techniques are presented. This will allow verifying the sign and the dimension of 
the relationship between the variables, whatever the constraints and limits of 
each technique. 
 
1.2.  Results 
 
 Even though the MG and PMG models do not require as preliminary tests the 
stationarity and co-integration analysis, prior to conducting the estimations. 
They were conducted with the objective of investigating the variable proprieties. 
This was meant to help establishing a long-run relationship between them and to 
support the results validity even in presence of a reduced number of explanatory 
variables and observations.  
 The first step was to detect the presence in the series of cross sectional de-
pendence in order to avoid misleading results with the use of inappropriate 
methodologies.  
 Panel A in Table 1 shows the absence of cross sectional dependence accord-
ing to both Pesaran (2004) and Friedman (1937) tests, indicating that the stand-
ard instruments to test stationarity and co-integration can be used. In panel B the 
results of LLC (Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002), ADF and PP (Maddala and Wu, 
1999) tests are presented. It should be noted that these tests have a high power 
in small samples in the absence of cross sectional dependence (Lopez, 2009). 
The variables appear to be non-stationary in their level and I(1).  
 Finally in panel C the co-integration tests are presented. The Kao (1999) test 
on residuals rejects the null hypothesis of no co integration and the Johansen-     
-Fisher (see Johansen, 1991) both trace and eigen-tests support the existence of 
one co integrating vector.  
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T a b l e  1  
Cross Sectional Independence, Unit Root and Co-integration  
Panel A. Cross sectional Independence 
Test  Test statistics 
CSD Pesaran  1.354 (0.1756) 
CSD Friedman 3.350 (0.9992) 
Panel B. Panel unit root test 
 LLC ADF PP 
PR     3.328   13.322   18.485 
SA   –0.644   23.506   50.566 
DPR –11.110*** 140.427*** 123.527*** 
DSA   –9.020***   92.608*** 173.581*** 
Panel C. Panel co-integration test 
Kao 
–2.108** 
Johansen-Fisher 
 Trace test eigen test 
R = 0     42.11**     44.88** 
R ≤ 1 17.82 17.82 
Note:***, **, and * reject the null at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
The tests are; Levin, Lin and Chu (2002); (LLC); ADF Fisher χ2 (ADF) and PP Fisher χ2(PP) because of Mad-
dala and Wu (1999). 
 
 After having highlighted the presence of co-integration according to which 
the number of people below the 60% of the median equalized disposable income 
and structural adjustment are stably related in the long-run, we can proceed with 
the presentation of the results of the estimation of the dynamic panel models.  
 In Table 2 long-run and short-run coefficients, estimated according to the 
three techniques, are presented, together with the speed of adjustment. Following 
the MG, PMG and DFE, the long-run coefficient is positive and significant 
(0.985, for MG, 1.126 for PMG and 0.737 for DFE) confirming the initial hy-
pothesis that restrictive discretionary policy measures increase the percentage of 
people that are below the 60% of national median equalized disposable income. 
In all three cases the value is not far from one and in the PMG results, it exceeds 
this value.  
 The speed of adjustment or the way in which the two variables reach the 
long-run equilibrium is negative and highly significant, confirming the validity 
of the models adopted.5 
                                                     
 
5
 The ECM requires that the coefficient representing the adjustment process has to be lower 
than zero and greater than one. 
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T a b l e  2 
People at Risk of Poverty Rate and Structural Adjustment:  
Panel Co-integration Results (eq. 1 and 2)  
Dependent variable MG PMG DFE 
Long-run: SA   0.985** 
 (0.381) 
  1.126*** 
 (0.145) 
  0.737*** 
 (0.163) 
iφ : speed of adjustment –0.565*** 
 (0.148) 
–0.371*** 
 (0.129) 
–0.439*** 
 (0.064) 
Short-run: ΔSA –0.001 
 (0.189) 
  0.235*** 
 (0.089) 
  0.201*** 
 (0.056) 
Intercept 10.962*** 
 (3.569) 
  9.154*** 
 (3.244) 
  9.772*** 
 (1.421) 
Observations   125     125    125 
Number of countries 16 16 16 
Hausman Testa 0.15 
Hausman Testb       7.80*** 
Note:***, **, and * reject the null at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Standard errors are presented below the estimated coefficients:  
a) PMG is preferred to MG under null Hypothesis; b) DFE is preferred to PMG under null hypothesis. 
 
 In the short-run the link between relative poverty and structural adjustment is 
again positive and highly significant for two out of three of the models (0.235 
for PMG and 0.201 for DFE) while for the MG model nothing can be stated on 
the matter. According to these results, the same relationship individuated in the 
long-run is reproduced when considering the differenced variables. This means 
that an increase in the change of structural adjustment increases the change in the 
relative poverty rate (and vice versa), reinforcing the long-run results. 
 To improve the consistency of the estimate and to individuate the model that 
fits best the features of the series, the Hausman test is performed. The last line of 
Table 2 shows that the best choice to be adopted is the PMG model, according to 
which the long-run effect of fiscal retrenchments on relative poverty is higher.  
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 During the 1980s, the growing budget deficit and very high public debt 
pushed many countries to adopt general criteria of spending constraints. Aca-
demics agreed that there was the need to consolidate public finances due to the 
instability effects of real, monetary and financial markets. In Europe, the institu-
tional claims coming from the existing monetary union assigned further impetus 
for the implementation of fiscal retrenchments.  
 The aim of the paper was to investigate the relationship between structural 
adjustment and a relative measure of poverty using data from 2005 till 2013 in 
16 Eurozone countries. Using the panel data estimators allowing for different 
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dynamics in each country, the paper supports the conclusion that there is the 
same sign link between structural adjustment policies and the percentage of people 
below the 60% of the median equalized income. 
 Following the MG, the PMG and DFE econometrical estimations it has been 
found out that the restrictive ∆SA > 0 discretionary fiscal policy actions increase 
relative poverty irrespectively of their nature and composition. This relation is 
confirmed both in the long and in the short-run. 
 The results suggest, therefore, that if the reduction of structural balance has to 
be considered as an objective to be achieved per se, in order to reduce financial 
market instability and face increasing health and pension expenditures, policy 
makers should take into account that the increase of relative poverty is a very 
probable outcome. 
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